The categorical imperative applied to a false promise In the foundations of the metaphysics of morality, Kant seeks to establish the supreme principle of morality (Kant. 392), the categorical imperative, serve as a standard against which actions can be evaluated for their moral value. Kant believes that actions motivated by personal experience, whether through observation, indoctrination, or some other ability, are devoid of moral value because such actions are not determined by the conception of moral law. When empirical considerations such as effects, habits, consequences, or material objects shape, alter, and manipulate the will and thus form the foundation for an individual's decision formation, moral problems abound. The empirical education of knowledge, cultural tradition, desire, purpose, and consequences impede moral action because they provide reason for inconsistencies, biases, and inclinations to influence the will of the individual. Kant therefore believes that morality must be separated from conceptions that develop a posteriori, through or after human experience and that moral action must rest on the unalterable element of pure reason. Because pure reason and respect for moral law direct moral action by influencing the will and conception of duty, the separation of morality from aspects of human experience allows individuals to form maxims that allow their actions to be rightly willed in universal law, which Kant believes is necessary to determine the moral content of actions. Kant's sa priori theory of morality addresses the potential problems or contradictions that may arise from the universalization of a maxim (i.e. the mendacious promise) when he constructs formulations of his categorical imperative that require universality in the formation of moral law, maintaining the autonomy of will and treating individuals as ends in themselves. Consequently, making false promises is contrary to the categorical imperative because the universal fabrication of false promises would be impossible because if everyone did not fulfill their promises, the institution of promising would collapse, no one would believe the promises or accept contracts that they knew would be broken ( 442). .Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an Original Essay The importance of universal law in determining the moral value of an action is evident when making a false promise; a needy man finds himself forced to borrow money. He knows he can't repay, but he promises to do it anyway. His maxim or moral principle of action is "when I believe I need money, I will borrow money and promise to pay it back, even if I know I cannot." How would things be if this were a universal law? This law of false promises destroys the entire concept of promises, since no one would believe anyone. It is therefore immoral, since it cannot be rationally universalized. And in fact reason creates an ideal affirmation of subjective action. The moral imperative is unconditional; that is, its imperative force is not tempered by the conditional "if I want to achieve an end, then do X". Simply state: Do X. Kant believes that reason imposes a categorical imperative for moral action. He provides at least three formulations of the Categorical Imperative: a) "Act only according to that maxim with which you can at the same time will it to become a universal law". (422); b) "Act as if the maxim of your action should, by your will, become a universal law of nature." (Ibid.); c) Act in a way that treats humanity, both in your person andin that of others, always as an end and never only as a means" (429). Furthermore, when we apply the universality test to this maxim it becomes clear that if everyone acted in this way, the very institution of the promise would be undermined. In order for the principle of an action to apply uniformly in this case and others, it must exist independently of the conditions, restrictions, or subjectivity of a particular will or circumstance. External influences and internal biases outside the realm of pure reason vary in each individual and therefore cannot act as a maxim of action if universal adherence and relevance is desired. Moral value cannot exist in an action that applies to a specific condition because it leads to the formation of hypothetical imperatives, subsequent principles and subject to contingencies. Aspects of human experience can make morality subjective and uniquely different for each individual if empirical knowledge and experience direct the formation of moral principles. Using an assortment of personal experiences and a priori knowledge to guide moral action, each individual arrives at a course of action that best suits their interests but is not universally applicable. Furthermore, empirical principles cannot serve as a basis for moral laws, because if the foundation of universality by which they should be valid for all rational beings without distinction derives from a particular tendency of human nature or from the accidental circumstance in which it loves universality be lost (442). Therefore, the use of empirical knowledge and experiences interferes with the establishment of a moral law to which individuals can turn for guidance in action because it neither establishes a moral conception nor provides a method of evaluating moral value. Kant's autonomy formula addresses moral problems, such as a moral promise, that can occur when action is guided by a will constrained by influence, empirical knowledge, or experience and devoid of governance by pure experience. Kant explains that individuals should act in such a way that [their] will can at the same time be considered as universal law through its maxim (431). Because individuals are rational beings, they have the will or ability to act according to principles. This right to autonomy of the will is the essence of humanity (430) and rationality, and it must be free to determine action on its own through the use of pure reason. When empirical knowledge is not separated from the motivation for decision and action, pure reason, the element of the mind uninfluenced by the empirical, is unable to fully direct the will. Since Kant recognizes that experience corrupts objectivity and obscures the function of pure reason, he explains that if the will goes out and seeks law in the property of any of its objects, heteronomy always results. In fact, then it is not the will that gives itself the law, but it is the object, through its relationship with the will, that gives it the law (441). By eliminating a posteriori reasoning in action, the individual can avoid inconsistency in action and heteronomy of will, the imposition of laws from the outside. Kant therefore believes that the autonomy of the will to determine action and to act in accordance with universal law justifies the need to eliminate from the decision-making process the corruptibility and immorality that can arise from preconceived and empirical notions of morality and law. Furthermore, experience-based conceptions of morality cannot constitute a standard evaluation when making decisions, because for every example of morality exhibited it must have previously been judged according to principles of morality to see whether it was worthy of serving as an example. -