In their classic propositions of the perfect capital market, Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) assume that management acts exclusively on behalf of the shareholders. Therefore, there is no information asymmetry because insiders (management) and outsiders (shareholders/investors) have the same information about the firm's future investment opportunities. Contrary to Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963), the empirical evidence provided by Jensen and Mekling (1976) and Myers (1977) suggests that management may place its own personal interests before those of shareholders, which leads to a problem of conflict of interest. between the two parties. Jensen and Mekling (1976) suggest that the separation between ownership and management gives rise, among other things, to the problem of information asymmetry. Being internal to the company, management is more informed than shareholders/investors. This situation can tempt (induce) them to work for their own interests. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that information asymmetry leads to misvaluing the firm's capital on the market, causing a loss of wealth for existing shareholders. Consequently, if this problem is not completely resolved, it can potentially undermine the functioning of the capital market (Akerlof, 1970). Kim and Nofsinger (2007) suggest two mechanisms to solve the information asymmetry problem: incentives and monitoring. The incentive mechanism attempts to align the interests of managers with those of investors. This requires management to disclose relevant information to investors. Empirical evidence provided by Welker (1995) demonstrates that a greater disclosure policy reduces information asymmetry. Bloomfield and Wilks (2000) show that higher quality disclosures ensure that investors pay a high price for stocks. According to Heflin et al. (2002) a firm with high-quality accounting information improves market liquidity by reducing information asymmetries among traders. The second mechanism is for the board of directors to effectively monitor management behavior and actions. Empirical evidence shows that board monitoring improves the quality of managers' decisions (Monks and Minow, 1995). According to Healy and Palepu (2001), board monitoring will ensure that management behaves in a way that enhances shareholder interests and discloses credible rather than self-serving information. However, the effectiveness of the board's control is determined, among other things, by its composition. Therefore, board composition is expected to influence the level of voluntary disclosure. In this sense, the aim of this study is to investigate, empirically, the relationship between board composition and the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Jordanian companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE). literature on voluntary disclosure and corporate governance in different ways.