The first case against functionalism is the "homunculus head". In this thought experiment Block asks us to conceive of a body externally equivalent to our own, but with a distinct body internally distinct (p. 215). The homunculus head uses little men to process input and output. Each man plays a role normally played by a part of your brain. G-men do not work together on any functional role in the system, so little intelligence is needed to be a G-man. However, each G-man is capable of performing the same role that a part of your brain would normally do. If you add enough roles in a brain you can reach qualitative states. With the head-homunculus these roles cannot be combined to give rise to a qualitative state. Since all G-men perform the same role as the brain, the two systems are functionally equivalent. If functionalism is true, then an arrangement of G-men could have qualitative status. But it's intuitively false that a bunch of unintelligent G-men could have a single mental state that you would normally have. So functionalism is false. The general point behind the homunculus head introduces the consideration of the possibility that brain functions are performed by parts that together could not be conscious. Functionalism requires only similar machine instructions that provide a set of outputs given a set of inputs. Block's counterarguments show such an account of