Combining a type of government in which bureaucrats have greater ability to formulate and implement public policies simultaneously under a powerful executive becomes even more dangerous if both the interests of the administration that those of the executive align with each other but not that of the citizens. The effect of external and internal controls in keeping bureaucrats in check can probably be manipulated; as John Dalberg-Acton exclaimed, “power corrupts; absolute power corrupts absolutely” (Mintz et al., 2013). Also of concern is the fact that bureaucrats are not publicly elected and therefore are not regulated by the citizens whom the decisions they make are supposed to benefit (Gruber, 1987). As Judith Gruber exclaims in her book Controlling Bureaucracies (1987), bureaucrats: are generally people hired on the basis of competitions, promoted on the basis of the judgment of other bureaucrats and fired only in cases of extreme provocation. How then can their work be controlled by ordinary people? How can we reconcile the growth of decision-making in powerful government bureaucracies with our ideas of democracy and popular control?