Jaegwon Kim believes that the multiple realizability of mental properties would lead to the conclusion that psychology is most likely not a science. Several functionalists, notably Fodor, take an opposite position to Kim, arguing that the multiple realizability of mental states is one of the reasons why psychology is an autonomous and justifiable science. In essence, Kim thinks that for mental states to be multiply realizable, psychology must be fundamentally broken; with human psychology encompassing properties realized for humans and alien psychology encompassing those alien-realized mental states etc. I will demonstrate that even if one supports and allows for the principles underlying Kim's argument, they do not lead to his final conclusion about psychology failing to be a science. By attacking his principle of Random Detection of Types I will demonstrate that Kim failed to find the correct conclusion. Additionally, I will consider a possible objection that Kim might make to my position and give a brief response. I will conclude by giving Jerry Fodor's account of what Kim's essential problem is. By proving that Kim's conclusion fails, this will imply that Fodor's conclusion is more viable in reality. Jaegwon Kim thinks that the multiple realizability of mental properties would lead to the conclusion that psychology is most likely not a science. Several functionalists, notably Fodor, take an opposite position to Kim, arguing that the multiple realizability of mental states is one of the reasons why psychology is an autonomous and justifiable science. In essence, Kim thinks that for mental states to be multiply realizable, psychology must be fundamentally broken; with human psycho... middle of paper... fortunately for Kim, he can't decide what an official sanction is. As Fodor states in the conclusion of his 1997 article, one must not only attack generalizations but also evidence, predictions, and then generalizations not actually producing true results. As he simply states: “You have to actually do science” (Fodor, 1997. p.162). Once this is done, you can clearly see that mental states can be multiply realized to the point where the results are logically confirmed. Through examples and by explaining why Kim's conclusion is a mistake, I have shown that Fodor's conclusion that psychology is a science is valid. Works Cited Kim, Jaegwon (1992), "Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52: 1 -26. Fodor, Jerry (1997), “Special Sciences: Still Autonomous After All These Years”, Perspectives philosophical 11: 149-163.