Negative and positive freedom are best understood as distinct values ​​within Berlin's scheme of value pluralism. While an increase in either is desirable, ceteris paribus, attempting to maximize any single idea of ​​freedom without regard to other values ​​necessarily leads to absurd and clearly undesirable conclusions; any sensible idea of ​​joint maximization of freedom in general, therefore, must recognize the trade-offs inherent in increasing one aspect of freedom or another. The tension here is similar to the familiar trade-off between fairness and efficiency in economics; Negative and positive freedom are not diametrically opposed, but the two ideals cannot be individually maximized at the same time. Berlin defines an individual's negative freedom as the extent to which he is “allowed to do what he is capable of doing or being, without interference from other people” (169). Tying freedom fundamentally to the absence of (“freedom from”) coercion, advocates of negative freedom generally argue that the defining characteristic of a violation of freedom is “deliberate interference by other human beings” (169). (However, Berlin seems to admit that relaxing the deliberateness of the actions of interfering agents does not fundamentally alter this concept of freedom.) Negative freedom as Berlin defines it, then, clearly does not constitute the affirmation of human potential in any sense. We are free if and only if we have no obstacles in the pursuit of what is feasible; whether we take Berlin at face value here, whether and to what extent we actually realize our capabilities is completely irrelevant to the question of freedom in the negative sense. The most pertinent of Berlin's immediate conclusions is that a p...... half of the article...a substantial level of public provision for education is politically defensible in a philosophical sense, and solidly so. The most reasonable approach, therefore, seems to require commitment to a certain (tolerable) level of negative freedom for every private individual. Therefore, after having carved out a sufficiently large private sphere, society should be structured in such a way as to guarantee each person as much positive freedom as possible. Although negative and positive freedom are not fundamentally at odds with each other, society at large faces an inherent and inevitable trade-off between the two values. Since positive freedom by its nature represents a long-term, (arguably) more satisfactory criterion by which to evaluate one's life, its priority thus defined over negative freedom seems an acceptable response to the inevitable decision that the social planner will have to make. face..