In this article, I will examine Nagasena's view of no-self and question his claim for a permanent self. I will argue that the self exists because it was created, that the self exists from its point of creation. I will then try to justify the premise of my argument as it helps resolve the thesis that the memory and history of the self, which Nagasena does not explain, are what defines the self. In The Questions of King Milinda, Nagasena argues that the self does not exist. Using the analogy of the chariot, he argues: 1) The chariot is not merely its post, its axle, its wheels, or any other of its constituent parts. 2) The chariot is not something outside of its constituent parts. 3) The chariot is not all its constituent parts. Therefore, the chariot does not exist. Rather, the name “chariot” is just a “generally understood term” for something that has all the constituent parts of chariot put together. The names of compound things are simply empty sounds that exist as ideas and are used to refer to the whole of its constituent parts when put together in reality. In relation to the self, the names we assign to the self would therefore have "no permanent individuality implicit in the [name]", because there is no fixed set of constituent parts that would form the same self. The constituent parts of the self continually change and, therefore , the name we use to refer to a self does not refer to the same combination and arrangement of a particular group of constituent parts over time. This is why he believes that “there is no permanent individuality involved in the matter,” whereas the question refers to his name, “Nagasena” and to the self to which the name refers, the name we use to re… the center of the card… the former 'permanent individuality, the self does not exist. We remove this requirement, the self can then exist. However, basing the existence of the self on memory and history gives rise to controversy the self with its creation over time as a permanent factor. This relationship does not limit the existence of the self to require that all its constituent parts remain permanent, so the changes that the self undergoes can be considered part of it, but at the same time have a permanent property, which is the moment when it was created.Works Cited'Maverick Philosopher: Can the Chariot Take Us to the Land of No-Self?'. Np 18 Mac 2011. Web. 22 November. 2013. .